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Abstract
Using data for 53 developed and emerging economies from 1970 to
2006, this article investigates empirically the impact of trade openness on
the real exchange rate devaluations that result from a large and unex-
pected fall in capital in￿ ows.
1 Introduction
The abrupt interruption of capital in￿ ows and its impact on the economy have
been intensively debated since the Mexican crisis in 1994, and, later, the Asian
crises, in 1997. This phenomenon is named sudden stop and it was ￿rst coined
by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and ValdØs (1995). Commonly, sudden stops are coped
initially with losses of international reserves, followed by a reversion of the
current account￿ s net result.
Initially, governments try to accommodate the impact of sudden stops in the
balance of payments by spending international reserves, but this strategy fails
to succeed since the episode, in most cases, persists for a longer period than
the one in which current account de￿cits can be ￿nanced by the total stock of
international reserves. The balance of payments de￿cit is, then, eliminated by
a reversal of the current account￿ s net result, speci￿cally by a reversal of the
trade balance￿ s net result; since we do not consider the hypothesis of default of
existing obligations and liabilities. The growth mechanism of the trade balance,
in most cases, is related to a real devaluation of the domestic currency.
It remains necessary to understand why does a real devaluation in the domes-
tic currency happen? The answer brings us back to the famous debate between
John Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin over the payment of war debts in Ger-
many during the 20￿ s, which became widely known as the "Transfer Problem".
￿The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Secretaria de Pol￿tica Econ￿mica, UniversitØ de Cergy-Pontoise, or EPGE/FGV.
1Keynes argued that, in order to pay for the war damages in foreign currency,
Germany would have to raise the resources through surpluses in the trade bal-
ance. Hence, tradable goods￿prices would have to fall; that is, the terms of trade
would have to deteriorate and the deustche mark would have to devalue. Ohlin
disagreed with this argument by considering the bene￿ts related to the trade
balance surplus. The reparation payments to the Allies would reduce the pur-
chasing power of the Germans, reducing their expenditure in both domestic and
imported goods. Besides, domestic goods that were not sold in Germany could
be exported. Demand of non-tradable goods would also be reduced and, as a
consequence, non-tradable goods￿prices would fall as well (real currency deval-
uation). Then, the resources allocated to their production would migrate to the
production of exported goods and to the substitution of imported goods. On
the other hand, the bene￿ciaries countries￿purchasing power would increase,
raising imports and the consumption of exportable and non-tradable goods.
Therefore, the production of tradable goods would fall while the production of
non-tradable goods would rise.
Ohlin￿ s argument was qualitatively similar to Keynes￿with respect to the
behavior of the real exchange rate; that is, it would appreciate in the countries
that receive capital and it would depreciate in those countries that transfer
capital. However, according to Ohlin, the magnitude of the currency devaluation
would depend on the local expenditure adjustment. Nevertheless, the terms
of trade behavior did not necessarily coincide in the two arguments. Keynes
believed that the deterioration of the terms of trade would be unavoidable while
Ohlin conditioned their behavior to the expenditure adjustment that would
occur in the two set of countries - the debtors and creditors of capital.
Economies that su⁄er sudden stops are often receivers of foreign capital and,
thus, present an overvalued exchange rate. At the moment of capital in￿ ow
contraction, these economies start to behave as those which transfer capital
and, in such a new situation, they must generate a trade balance surplus within
the dynamics o⁄ered by Ohlin, implying a real devaluation of the exchange rate.
The power of the economy to generate the necessary trade balance surplus
as to reach equilibrium in the balance of payments without incurring in large
real exchange rate devaluations determines the extension of the social losses
resulted from the abrupt liquidity restrictions related to sudden stops. In fact,
the magnitude of the currency devaluation may be in￿ ated or mitigated by fac-
tors that cannot be controlled by local actions (exogenous factors) as economic
growth and/or more world trade openness. Yet, the ability to generate trade bal-
ance surpluses without incurring in large currency devaluations is a feature that
can be developed by public policies independently of international conjectures.
This is the reason why we consider important to investigate which institutional
framework guarantees the development of this ability in an economy.
The greater is the intensity of the trade balance response to the real ex-
change rate devaluation, the least necessary is the need for large devaluations
in order to reach an equilibrium in the balance of payments. Currency devalua-
tions are particularly harmful to the economies which present the "original sin"
as de￿ned by Eichengreen et all (2003). The "original sin" is the lack of capacity
2to issue debt denominated in local currency, a characteristic that distinguishes
emerging and developed economies. Economies that commit this sin su⁄er sud-
den stops more frequently1 while the severity of the related damages are greater
since the associated currency devaluation raises the cost of the foreign exchange
rate denominated debt. Indeed, it constitutes another reason why we consider
important the relationship between the behavior of the trade balance and the
currency devaluation.
In this article, we verify that the weight of international trade in the economy
is the variable that determines the capacity to generate large trade balance
surpluses without incurring in a signi￿cant devaluation of the domestic currency.
The empirical evidence found in this article shows that, in economies with a
greater international trade ￿ ow, the growth response of the trade balance surplus
for a given currency devaluation tends to be larger. In general terms, the reason
behind this behavior is that the real exchange rate devaluation has a greater
impact in the trade balance in absolute terms for a larger total volume of exports
and imports. For example, suppose that a 1% devaluation in the currency leads
to a 1% increase of total exports and a 1% reduction of total imports in an
emerging economy. In this respect, the trade balance surplus is proportional to
the total volume of exports and imports of an economy before the devaluation.
In the example above, we consider that a real devaluation in the domestic
currency has a symmetric e⁄ect in exports (+1%) and imports (-1%). However,
the results of the empirical analysis carried out in Terra and Vasconcelos (2005)
shows an asymmetrical e⁄ect, that is, exports are more sensitive than imports
to real exchange rate devaluations.
This article is organized as follows: in section 2, we show a description of a
relationship between the degree of trade openness and power of real exchange
rate devaluations on achieving trade balance surplus; in section 3 and 4, we
construct an empirical test for the model and analyze the results. Finally, in
section 5, we present our conclusion with respect to the importance of trade
openness in countries subject to sudden stops shocks.
2 Trade Openness E⁄ect
In this section we present a simple rationale that explains the greater ability of
more open economies to generate large trade balance surpluses without incurring
in a signi￿cant devaluation of the domestic currency.
Consider the trade balance as a function of the real exchange rate
TB(q) = PX(q)X(q) ￿ PM(q)M(q);
where X and M are the exports and imports, respectively, and PX and PM are
their respective price indexes.
We can rewrite this relation in terms of semi-elasticities and elasticities
1Calvo et ali (2004) ￿nd empirical evidence that support the idea that less trade
openness and greater domestic debt dollarization determine the increase in the prob-


















￿TB=Y;q = ￿X￿PXX;q ￿ ￿M￿PMM;q,
where ￿TB=Y;q is the change of the shares of balance trade with respect to
GDP in response to percentage changes in the real exchange rate, while ￿PXX;q
and ￿PMM;q are the percentage changes of exports income and imports expen-
diture in response to percentage changes in the real exchange rate, respectively.
As we know, ￿TB=Y;q, ￿PXX;q > 0 and ￿PMM;q < 0. ￿X and ￿M are the shares
of exports income and imports expenditure with respect to GDP.
Now, for the sake of comparison, consider two countries i and j that share
the same economic features except for the level of trade openness, i.e., they share
the same ￿PXX;q and ￿PMM;q, but the country i di⁄er from j about their shares
of exports income and imports expenditure with respect to GDP. Consequently,
the more open country i will have greater ￿X and ￿M than the closer country j.
It￿ s clear that ￿i
TB=Y;q > ￿
j
TB=Y;q and this e⁄ect is a direct consequence from the
greater volume of trade experienced in the more open economy. We denote this
phenomenon as "openness e⁄ect" and it is caused by both export and import
volumes as showed below:
@￿TB=Y;q
@￿X




= ￿￿PMM;q > 0:
3 Data Description
We use quarterly data for 53 countries from 1970 to 2006 extracted from the
IFS-IMF database. Not all countries have data available for all periods, hence
we may have not been able to identify all the sudden stop episodes which ef-
fectively occurred over the period. Moreover, the lack of monthly data reduces
the accuracy of the identi￿cation of the start and the end of each sudden stop
episode.
Next we present the variables that are used in empirical tests of the openness
e⁄ect.
As a proxy for capital ￿ ow, we use the di⁄erence between the current account
and the international reserves variation. We do not use directly the capital ￿ ow
4data because, for most countries, it is presented only on an annual basis, which
does not allow the identi￿cation of sudden stops that were initiated and ￿nished
in the same calendar year.
The real exchange rate series are bilateral rates, using the CPI indexes for
the US and each domestic economy. The trade volume is the sum of exports
and imports as a fraction of the size of the economy, proxied by the GDP.
As discussed in the introduction, the extent of ￿nancial dollarization a⁄ects
the costs of an exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, in economies presenting
large currency mismatches, the government may resist exchange rate devaluation
by implementing policies such as selling international reserves or increasing the
domestic interest rates. As a measure of debt dollarization, we use the currency
mismatch in the government￿ s balance sheet. It is calculated as the ratio between
net liability of the monetary authority denominated in the foreign currency and
the amount of (￿at) money in circulation2.
It is clear that the intensity of the liquidity shock caused by the sudden stop
is also crucial for explaining the magnitude of the variation of real exchange
rate. Hence, we create a variable to measure the intensity of the shock, given
by the annual capital ￿ ow variation as a share of the GDP3.
We add annual growth of world exports as another exogenous variable in
our model. This variable captures the trading conjuncture at the moment of
the occurrence of sudden stop episodes. We believe that in a context of higher
growth of world exports, the growth of exports respond with more intensity
to exchange rate devaluations and, therefore, there is a lower need for large
currency devaluations during sudden stop episodes.
Finally, the yearly variation of the terms of trade is also added as another
explaining variable for the real exchange rate depreciation. As already men-
tioned in the introduction, the terms of trade a⁄ect the dynamics of the sudden
stop, and their variation should have a strong in￿ uence on the trade balance.
The interest rate variation would be another important variable that we
should use as a control when assessing the openness e⁄ect, but when the ex-
change rate regime is ￿xed, the monetary policy becomes a hostage of the ex-
change rate behavior. Then it would serve as a control only when sudden stops
occur during ￿ oating exchange rate regimes. However, using the de facto clas-
si￿cation of exchange rate regimes of Levi-YeYati and Sturzenegger (2002), we
￿nd that the number of episodes identi￿ed under this regime is very low and
not enough to allow reasonable tests.
Identifying Sudden Stops Our criteria to identify sudden stop episodes
is based on that of Calvo et al. (2004), but adapted to our quarterly data.
A sudden stop episode happens when there is at least one quarter in which
the capital ￿ ow change4 is at least two standard deviations lower than the
2Alesina e Wagner (2003) used the same ratio to measure the debt dollarization level.
3Yearly changes are used to avoid seasonal e⁄ects.
4A negative variation means that a country transfers more or receives less capital than
before.
5average change5, or when there are at least two consecutive quarters in which
the capital ￿ ow change is at least one standard deviation below its average. We
do not require persistence for a drop of capital ￿ ows greater than two standard
deviations because we would risk missing the identi￿cation of sudden stops that
lasted for less than six months. On the other hand, we do not allow two episodes
separated by only one quarter, so that in such situation we consider them both
as only one by merging them.
Di⁄erently from Calvo et al. (2004), we do not require a GDP contraction
to characterize a sudden stop event, since we also want to capture episodes
of capital ￿ ow contraction in economies that were able to adjust to the shock
less costly. In particular, we are interested in investigating whether more open
economies are better tailored to promote larger increases in trade balance with
relatively lower exchange rate devaluation. As large unexpected swings in the
real exchange rate are a source of cost for the economy, more open economies
could cope less costly with sudden stops.
It is true that, by not excluding events that did not present a GDP con-
traction, we risk capturing large changes in capital ￿ ows due to positive shocks,
such as a positive shock of terms of trade. We have to keep that in mind when
interpreting our results.
Using our procedure, we identify 215 sudden stop episodes: 100 of them
occurred in OECD countries and 115 in emerging economies. Note, though,
that data is not available for the 70￿ s and 80￿ s for the majority of the emerging
economies. Restricting to the period between 1990 and 2006, there were 48
episodes in developed economies and 84 in emerging ones. Hence, sudden stops
seem to be a much more commonly emerging markets phenomenon.
In Figure 1 we observe that a signi￿cant number of episodes in the OECD
countries occurred during the European Monetary System crises (1990 and 1992)
and the Asian crisis (1998), while, in emerging economies, the episodes are
concentrated around the Mexican crisis (1994 to 1995), Asian and the Russian
crises (1998), Argentinean crisis (2001), and 2003 to 2004. The bunching of
crises seems to indicate that the incidence of the episode within a subgroup
(developed or emerging) has contagion e⁄ect features. Nevertheless, Calvo et
al. (2006) ￿nd that more closed economies or those with a higher degree of
dollar denominated debt have a higher probability of experiencing a sudden
stop episode.
5Both the average and the standart deviations are calculated in a three year window
















































































Once we have identi￿ed the episodes, we proceed with two empirical tests for
identi￿cation of the openness e⁄ect. The ￿rst one uses cross-section data, while
the second uses time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data. We use these both tests
because they complement each other with respect to the advantages and draw-
backs of their speci￿cations. While the ￿rst has trouble with endogeneity issues,
the second treats this problem using instruments in order to mitigate the prob-
lem. On the other hand, the speci￿cation of the second is very much impacted
by the lack of accuracy of the identi￿cation algorithm with respect to the ex-
act moment of the episode, while the speci￿cation of the ￿rst test is not much
sensitive to this problem.
The both tests con￿rm very soundly the existence of the openness e⁄ect.
The ￿rst test ￿nds clear evidence that higher share of debt denominated in
foreign currencies motivates governments to procrastinate a de￿nite solution to
the crisis, while the second test indicates that behavior with less con￿dence. In
the both tests, we have weak evidences that the openness e⁄ect is stronger in
emerging countries.
4.1 Cross-Section Analysis
In order to identify the relationship between the openness e⁄ect and the real
exchange rate variation, while avoiding endogeneity problems among the two
variables, we build a window called pre-episode. This window comprises the
three years before the year which the sudden stop occurred. We also build an
episode window that comprises the years in which the sudden stop occurs and the
subsequent year. From the episode window, we extract the dependent variable,
real exchange rate variation, and two explicative variables, world exports
variation and terms of trade variation, calculated as the averages of the
annual percentage variation of the real exchange rate, of the world exports, and
of the terms of trade, respectively. From the pre-episode window, we extract the
trade openness and dollarization, calculated respectively as the averages of
trade openness index and dollarization index. Since the data used to calculate
trade openness and dollarization are lagged to the data used to calculate real
7exchange rate variation, then there is no endogeneity problem between these
variables. With respect to world exports variation, there are also no endogeneity
problems since this variable belongs to a global context that is not signi￿cantly
a⁄ected by the episode. On the contrary, terms of trade variation is subject to
endogeneity issues, which we consider a serious drawback of this speci￿cation.
Figure 1 and 2 show the pre-episode and episode windows for the cases in
which the episode begins and ends in the same year and for the cases in which
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Case 2: episode with beginning and end in subequent years
Figure 3
The reason for the existence of an one-year period after the year the sudden
stop episode ends is to capture any late variation of the real exchange rate
that occurs in those cases which governments initially attempt to equilibrate
the balance of payments using international reserves in order to avoid the costs
associated with currency devaluations. Even though this strategy is applied in
most cases, it uses to fail because sudden stop episodes normally have a higher
persistence exactly in those cases where the currency takes a longer time to
devalue. Besides, the end of the episode usually coincides with the currency
devaluation6. In Figure 3, we show that some episodes con￿rm these stylized
facts.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reserves RER Sudden Stop
Figure 4
4.1.1 Results
Since we use a cross-section where the observations occur in distinct periods, we
cannot assume that the observations are identically distributed. Then, we cal-
culate dispersion measures using the White methodology and, thus, we present
con￿dence measures (p-values) for the coe¢ cients estimation that are robust to
the presence of heteroskesdacity.
In table 1 we ￿nd empirical evidence that openness e⁄ect is present in sudden
stop episodes. The coe¢ cient of openness is negative and signi￿cant around 1%
level of con￿dence in all regressions. As expected the coe¢ cients of terms of
trade shocks, the level of dollarization of debt, and the level of world openness
are all negative and statistically signi￿cant in all regressions. It indicates that,
when there is more trade in the world and/or a country experiences positive
shocks in its terms of trade, it needs a lower currency devaluation to generate
the necessary trade balance surplus as to reach equilibrium in the balance of
payments. The negative coe¢ cient of the level of debt dollarization indicates
that countries which have higher share of their debt denominated in foreign
currencies, refrain more to devaluate their currencies during these crises.
9Table 1. Dependent Variable: ￿t;t￿4log(rer)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.0246 ** 0.0173 0.0395 *** 0.0747 ***
(0.0500) (0.1779) (0.0044) (0.0002)
openness -0.0985 *** -0.0873 ** -0.1178 *** - 0.1187 ***
(0.0039) (0.0176) (0.0021) (0.0015)
sudden stop intensity 0.1298 0.1567 0.1480 0.1933 *
(0.1994) (0.1483) (0.2017) (0.0934)
terms of trade variation ￿ ￿ -0.2501 * -0.5485 *** -0.5243 ***
(0.0846) (0.0010) (0.0014)
dollarization ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.0318 *** -0.0283 ***
(0.0009) (0.0026)
world export variation ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -1.5365 **
(0.0159)
Observations 179 136 115 115
Adjusted R2 0.0375 0.0444 0.1561 0.1928
F statistics 4.4710 3.0902 6.2719 6.4452
Heteroskedastic robust p-value in parentesis
* 10% signi￿cative; ** 5% signi￿cative; *** 1% signi￿cative
Table 2 presents a weak evidence that openness e⁄ect is stronger in emerging
countries than in OECD ones. Despite the fact that the coe¢ cient of interaction
between the dummy d_emerging with openness is negative in all regressions,
it is not very signi￿cant. In the regressions (3) and (4), those which the ￿t is
reasonable, the level of con￿dence of this coe¢ cient is between 10% and 13%.
10Table 2. Dependent Variable: ￿t;t￿4log(rer)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.0056 0.0057 0.0164 0.0532 **
(0.6819) (0.6691) (0.2481) (0.0153)
d_emerging 0.0333 0.0237 0.0541 0.0600 *
(0.1895) (0.4576) (0.1344) (0.0992)
openness -0.0528 -0.0604 -0.0719 * -0.0738 *
(0.1638) (0.1216) (0.0793) (0.0772)
d_emerging * openness -0.0799 -0.0740 -0.1175 -0.1062
(0.1127) (0.2696) (0.1061) (0.1246)
Sudden Stop Intensity 0.1376 0.1869 ** 0.1920 * 0.2174 **
(0.1120) (0.0410) (0.0704) (0.0371)
Terms of Trade Variation -0.2664 -0.5847 *** -0.5432 ***
(0.1364) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dollarization -0.0391 *** -0.0365 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
World Export Variation -1.6663 **
(0.0319)
Observations 179 136 115 115
Adjusted R2 0.0385 0.0411 0.1727 0.2149
F statistics 2.7824 2.1567 4.9660 5.4583
Heteroskedastic robust p-value in parentesis
* 10% signi￿cative; ** 5% signi￿cative; *** 1% signi￿cative
4.2 Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis
We run a two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression in a time-series-cross-section
(TSCS) data controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects on both time and cross section dimen-
sions. Yearly real exchange rate logarithmic variation is the dependent variable
whereas the explanatory variables are the share of trade volume on gdp denoted
by openness, sudden stop intensity, debt dollarization and yearly terms of trade
logarithmic variation. The basic speci￿cations is
￿t;t￿4 log(rer)= ￿ + ￿0 d_episode+ ￿0 d_sudden_stop+
￿0 log(opennesst￿4)+￿1 d_episode log(opennesst￿4)+




￿1 d_episode ￿t;t￿4 log(terms_of_trade)+ "t:
(1)
The openness is lagged one year in order to avoid endogeneity problems
with the real exchange rate variation. The dummy variable d_sudden_stop is
11valued one on the quarters when a sudden stop happened while d_episode is
valued one on a window that comprises the quarters where d_sudden_stop is
valued one and a number of subsequent quarters (2, 4 or 6 depending on the
speci￿cation). The existence of d_episode is meant to capture any late real
exchange rate changes that occur when governments initially attempt to avoid
the real exchange rate devaluation by using international reserves to equilibrate
the balance of payments.
Notice in the regressions speci￿cation that the trade volume share with re-
spect to gdp and terms of trade shocks are interacted with d_episode while
sudden stop intensity and dollarization are interacted with d_sudden_stop. In-
tensity of the yearly variation of capital ￿ ows is a de￿ning property of the crisis,
so we cannot analyze its e⁄ect on real exchange rate devaluation out of the pe-
riod of crisis without hurting the crisis￿concept. The ￿nancial dollarization is a
variable that motivates governments to delay and/or mitigate at a ￿rst moment
the real exchange rate devaluation, so its e⁄ects are better estimated on the
period of crisis.
Finally, we control all the e⁄ects for terms of trade shocks. Terms of trade
shocks variation may be subject to endogeneity issues, so we use such variable
one-quarter lagged as instrument in a two-stage least square regression in order
to mitigate such problem.
4.2.1 Results
We run a TSLS regression in a time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data. We ex-
purgate from our estimates the ￿xed e⁄ects on both time and cross section
dimensions in order to take into account not only countries￿idiosyncrasies but
also the world context for each period which is common to all countries7. Since
we use a time-series-cross-section (TSCS), where the episodes occur in distinct
periods for distinct countries, we cannot assume that the observations are iden-
tically distributed in any of both dimensions. Hence, heteroskedastic robust
con￿dence intervals are computed using the Panel Corrected Standard Error
(PCSE) methodology introduced by Beck and Katz (1995).
Table 3 presents four regressions￿results for samples with 2093 observations
which are di⁄erent only because of the de￿nition of d_episode window. In the
second column, the dummies d_sudden_stop and d_episode are equal valued
whereas the episode window comprises the sudden stop window and the 2, 4
and 6 subsequent quarters in the third, fourth, and ￿fth columns, respectively.
Based on the results, we conclude that there is not strong evidence that openness
in￿ uences the exchange rate devaluation magnitude on the episode period, but
they do when this period is extended by encompassing subsequent quarters.
Notice that for the cases where d_episode window encompasses the d_sudden_stop
window and some subsequent quarters, the coe¢ cients of d_episode dummy are
always positive (at 10% or 1% levels of con￿dence) whereas the coe¢ cients of
7We have executed the Haussman test in order to compare ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation with
random e⁄ect speci￿cation. We have concluded that the ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation is the ap-
propriate one.
12Table 3. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables
no quarters 2 quarters 4 quarters 6 quarters
Constant 0.5548 *** 0.5404 *** 0.4995 *** 0.5030 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode -0.0168 0.0448 * 0.0788 *** 0.0618 ***
(0.5858) (0.0708) (0.0002) (0.0023)
d_sudden_stop — -0.0308 *** -0.0369 *** -0.0351 ***
— (0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1676 *** -0.1632 *** -0.1512 *** -0.1525 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0041 -0.0147 ** -0.0232 *** -0.0177 ***
(0.6752) (0.0274) (0.0001) (0.0013)
log(intensityt) -0.1324 *** -0.1327 *** -0.1371 *** -0.1356 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(intensityt) 0.2744 *** 0.3268 *** 0.3504 *** 0.3093 ***
(0.0074) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005)
log(dollarizationt) 0.1259 *** 0.1248 *** 0.1212 *** 0.1226 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0673 -0.0703 -0.0704 -0.0726
(0.1443) (0.1238) (0.1253) (0.1153)
At,t?4log(terms of trade) -0.3049 *** -0.3236 *** -0.3330 *** -0.3147 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode *At?4,t?8log(terms of trade) 0.2187 0.1700 0.1377 0.0626
(0.1969) (0.1316) (0.1836) (0.5137)
Observations 2093 2093 2093 2093
Adjusted R2 0.4599 0.4624 0.4652 0.4630
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
d_sudden_stop dummy are always negative (at 1% level of con￿dence). It
means that the d_sudden_stop window does not capture a considerable part of
the real exchange rate devaluation that occurs in sudden stop episodes. More-
over, the negative coe¢ cients (around 12% to 14% levels of con￿dence) of the
interaction between the dummy d_sudden_stop and the logarithm of degree of
debt dollarization indicates that governments refrain more at a ￿rst moment
to devaluate domestic currency the higher is the degree of liabilities denomi-
nated in foreign currencies. This evidence con￿rms that governments attempts
to not devaluate domestic currency when it means a very high rise in the cost
of the debt. That is the reason why the in￿ uence of trade openness on exchange
rate devaluation during sudden stop episodes is not well veri￿ed in the second
column.
The regressions results presented in third, fourth, and ￿fth columns show
negative and signi￿cant (at 1% level) coe¢ cients for the interaction between
the dummy d_episode and the logarithm of openness, which means that the
real exchange rate devaluation in sudden stop episodes is smaller in more open
economies. This result is controlled for the intensity of the sudden stop, for the
degree of dollarization of liabilities when the episode occurs, and for the terms
of trade shocks. As expected, higher intensity of a sudden stop leads to higher
real exchange rate devaluation.
Table 4 presents weak evidence that openness e⁄ect has stronger impact
in emerging economies during sudden stop episodes than in OECD countries.
The coe¢ cients of the interaction among log(opennesst￿4), d_episode, and
d_emerging are negative in all regressions, but signi￿cant at 10% level only
in the speci￿cation where episode window comprises the sudden stop and the
13Table 4. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables
2 quarters 4 quarters 6 quarters
Constant 0.5393 *** 0.4918 *** 0.4973 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0314 0.0480 *** 0.0409 **
(0.1616) (0.0132) (0.0269)
d_sudden_stop -0.0258 ** -0.0324 *** -0.0320 ***
(0.0183) (0.0012) (0.0009)
d_episode * d_emerging 0.0409 0.0911 * 0.0625
(0.4928) (0.0736) (0.2097)
d_sudden_stop * d_emerging -0.0150 -0.0137 -0.0100
(0.4764) (0.4649) (0.5777)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1628 *** -0.1489 *** -0.1508 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0120 * -0.0151 *** -0.0121 **
(0.0593) (0.0063) (0.0228)
d_episode * d_emerging * log(opennesst?4) -0.0088 -0.0239 * -0.0167
(0.5750) (0.0805) (0.2126)
log(intensityt) -0.1327 *** -0.1369 *** -0.1359 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(intensityt) 0.3355 *** 0.3619 *** 0.3179 ***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)
log(dollarizationt) 0.1245 *** 0.1196 *** 0.1218 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0689 -0.0708 -0.0714
(0.1462) (0.1397) (0.1377)
At,t?4log(terms of trade) -0.3225 *** -0.3291 *** -0.3111 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade) 0.1738 0.1295 0.0540
(0.1293) (0.2192) (0.5785)
Observations 2093 2093 2093
Adjusted R2 0.4621 0.4665 0.4631
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
subsequent year.
In appendix, we show regressions which change the speci￿cation (1) in order
to check the robustness of results obtained in tables 3 and 4. Tables 5, 6,
and 7 con￿rm the robustness of the existence of the openness e⁄ect during
sudden stops episodes. On the other hand, the stronger impact of the e⁄ect
in emerging countries is only con￿rmed at 10% level of signi￿cance when the
episode window comprises the sudden stop and 6 subsequent quarters (table
10). Despite that weak robustness, the coe¢ cient of the interaction among the
dummies d_episode, d_emerging, and the variable log(opennesst￿4) is negative
in all regressions in tables (8) and (9).
We run the same speci￿cations of tables (3) and (4) in tables (11) and (12),
but in a subsample where the time dimension starts in 1990 and ends in 2006.
It aims to check if the structural changes which occurred in world economy
between the 70￿ s and 90￿ s impacts the strength (or existence) of the openness
e⁄ect during sudden stops. The results con￿rm again the robustness of the
existence of the openness e⁄ect during sudden stops. In this subsample the
e⁄ect is stronger for all countries, but it is not stronger for emerging countries
than for OECD ones.
5 Conclusion
The empirical exercises carried out in this paper aim to understand the behavior
of the balance of payments during sudden stop episodes, particularly, the process
of reversion of the net results of the current account. The episode￿ s mecha-
14nism may be represented by the classical "Transfer Problem" discussed between
Keynes and Ohlin during the 20￿ s. In the case of sudden stops, economies play
the same role of the First World War￿ s winners as receptors of capital.
Using this metaphor, we can compare sudden stop episodes to a hypothetical
and non-declared default by Germany. In this case, the Allies, receptors of
capital, taking for granted the regular in￿ ow of resources and, hence, dependent
on them to ￿nance their liabilities; have to search for new solutions to reach
equilibrium in the Balance of Payments. A possible solution is to increase the
trade balance surplus which can be driven by a real exchange rate devaluation
and/or by a strong recession of the domestic economy.
We have veri￿ed that more open economies can achieve the equilibrium in
the Balance of Payments through smaller domestic currency devaluations, which
con￿rms the existence of an openness e⁄ect, i.e., the elasticity of trade balance
surplus with relation to real exchange rate is higher, the higher is the trade
volume experienced by an economy. The results seem to indicate that such
e⁄ect is greater in emerging economies. We also have found evidences that
higher share of debt denominated in foreign currencies motivates governments
to procrastinate a de￿nite solution to the crisis.
Real exchange rate devaluations represent a social cost and, therefore, it is
desirable that, when necessary, they should be small with a strong real e⁄ect.
The most important result of these empirical exercises reveal that trade open-
ness is the economic feature, under exclusive control of the country policymaker,
that provides the most powerful e⁄ect in the trade balance given currency de-
valuations. Considering this result and the one from Calvo et all (2004), which
identi￿es broader trade openness and lower domestic debt dollarization as char-
acteristics that reduce the probability of sudden stop occurrence, we emphasize
the importance of public policies that encourage international trade in emerging
economies.
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Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 2 subsequent quarters
Table 5. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables Specifications
I II III
Constant 0.4980 *** 0.6559 *** 0.6572 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0275 0.0144 0.0170
(0.2507) (0.5712) (0.0500)
d_sudden_stop -0.0318 *** -0.0348 *** -0.0348 ***
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0026)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1380 *** -0.1854 *** -0.1916 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0071 -0.0040 -0.0048
(0.2644) (0.5562) (0.4830)
log(intensityt) -0.1933 *** -0.1909 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0297
(0.1262)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2340 0.3179 0.4652
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 4 subsequent quarters
Table 6. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables Specifications
I II III
Constant 0.4760 *** 0.6260 *** 0.6290 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0804 *** 0.0699 *** 0.0663 ***
(0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0020)
d_sudden_stop -0.0393 *** -0.0441 *** -0.0434 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1325 *** -0.1774 *** -0.1839 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0196 *** -0.0182 *** -0.0174 ***
(0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0031)
log(intensityt) -0.1927 *** -0.1905 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0299
(0.1218)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2340 0.3179 0.4652
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
17Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 6 subsequent quarters
Table 7. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables Specifications
I II III
Constant 0.4699 *** 0.6160 *** 0.6191 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0843 *** 0.0747 *** 0.0698 ***
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0006)
d_sudden_stop -0.0380 *** -0.0442 *** -0.0440 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1311 *** -0.1749 *** -0.1815 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0207 *** -0.0190 *** -0.0174 ***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0018)
log(intensityt) -0.1924 *** -0.1898 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0300
(0.1211)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2348 0.3189 0.3137
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 2 subsequent quarters
Table 8. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables
I II III
Constant 0.4989 *** 0.6568 *** 0.6561 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0319 0.0222 0.0258
(0.1805) (0.3586) (0.2920)
d_sudden_stop -0.0157 * -0.0207 ** -0.0226 **
(0.0790) (0.0442) (0.0435)
d_episode * d_emerging -0.0116 -0.0143 -0.0170
(0.8212) (0.7839) (0.7388)
d_sudden_stop * d_emerging -0.0342 * -0.0354 ** -0.0274
(0.0537) (0.0485) (0.1487)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1383 *** -0.1857 *** -0.1912 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0100 -0.0079 -0.0100
(0.1300) (0.2352) (0.1462)
d_episode * d_emerging * log(opennesst?4) -0.0065 0.0079 0.0097
(0.6306) (0.5891) (0.4749)
log(intensityt) -0.1931 *** -0.1910 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0248
(0.2197)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2304 0.3153 0.3100
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
18Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 4 subsequent quarters
Table 9. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables
I II III
Constant 0.4732 *** 0.6217 *** 0.6223 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0482 ** 0.0405 * 0.0413 *
(0.0208) (0.0539) (0.0530)
d_sudden_stop -0.0221 *** -0.0296 *** -0.0313 ***
(0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0020)
d_episode * d_emerging 0.0737 * 0.0723 0.0635
(0.0923) (0.1062) (0.1455)
d_sudden_stop * d_emerging -0.0366 ** -0.0382 ** -0.0297 *
(0.0193) (0.0166) (0.0814)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1317 *** -0.1762 *** -0.1819 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0124 ** -0.0116 * -0.0130 **
(0.0339) (0.0468) (0.0322)
d_episode * d_emerging * log(opennesst?4) -0.0166 -0.0165 -0.0126
(0.1573) (0.1677) (0.2821)
log(intensityt) -0.1917 *** -0.1899 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0252
(0.2102)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2349 0.3192 0.3136
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
Episode window comprising the sudden stop and 6 subsequent quarters
Table 10. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer)
Variables
I II III
Constant 0.4655 *** 0.6093 *** 0.6105 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0457 ** 0.0372 * 0.0358 *
(0.0216) (0.0630) (0.0785)
d_sudden_stop -0.0214 *** -0.0304 *** -0.0334 ***
(0.0047) (0.0007) (0.0006)
d_episode * d_emerging 0.0892 ** 0.0913 ** 0.0842 **
(0.0318) (0.0321) (0.0429)
d_sudden_stop * d_emerging -0.0354 ** -0.0365 ** -0.0268
(0.0179) (0.0167) (0.1012)
log(opennesst?4) -0.1298 *** -0.1730 *** -0.1789 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0117 ** -0.0100 * -0.0101 *
(0.0359) (0.0743) (0.0815)
d_episode * d_emerging * log(opennesst?4) -0.0209 * -0.0220 * -0.0191 *
(0.0599) (0.0534) (0.0895)
log(intensityt) -0.1915 *** -0.1894 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)




d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0254
(0.2087)
At,t?4log(terms of trade)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade)
Observations 4027 3422 3142
Adjusted R2 0.2364 0.3209 0.3151
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
19Sample: 1990 to 2006
Table 11. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer). Period: 1990 to 2006.
Variables
2 quarters 4 quarters 6 quarters
Constant 0.7151 *** 0.6361 *** 0.6248 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0811 ** 0.1381 *** 0.1342 ***
(0.0212) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop -0.0261 -0.0331 ** -0.0313 **
(0.1193) (0.0298) (0.0341)
log(opennesst?4) -0.2131 *** -0.1906 *** -0.1883 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0221 ** -0.03748 *** -0.0350 ***
(0.0188) (0.0000) (0.0000)
log(intensityt) -0.1683 *** -0.1721 *** -0.1687 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(intensityt) 0.3006 *** 0.3457 *** 0.2988 ***
(0.0121) (0.0028) (0.0085)
log(dollarizationt) 0.1407 *** 0.1343 *** 0.1368 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.0956 ** -0.0935 * -0.0956 *
(0.0516) (0.0596) (0.0557)
At,t?4log(terms of trade) -0.3461 *** -0.3668 *** -0.3398 ***
(0.0087) (0.0047) (0.0138)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade) 0.1774 0.1806 0.0800
(0.3979) (0.3937) (0.7003)
Observations 1239 1239 1239
Adjusted R2 0.3773 0.3896 0.3901
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
Table 12. Dependent Variable:At,t?4log(rer). Period: 1990 to 2006.
Variables
2 quarters 4 quarters 6 quarters
Constant 0.7076 *** 0.6174 *** 0.6214 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode 0.0858 *** 0.1349 *** 0.1567 ***
(0.0089) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop -0.0250 -0.0340 ** -0.0334 **
(0.1211) (0.0195) (0.0164)
d_episode * d_emerging -0.0053 0.0151 -0.0391
(0.9434) (0.8072) (0.5187)
d_sudden_stop * d_emerging 0.0036 0.0092 0.0100
(0.8968) (0.7180) (0.6843)
log(opennesst?4) -0.2110 *** -0.1852 *** -0.1874 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * log(opennesst?4) -0.0266 *** -0.0396 *** -0.0446 ***
(0.0040) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_episode * d_emerging * log(opennesst?4) 0.0084 0.0023 0.0175
(0.6677) (0.8897) (0.2841)
log(intensityt) -0.1695 *** -0.1757 *** -0.1715 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(intensityt) 0.2917 *** 0.3378 *** 0.2974 ***
(0.0150) (0.0037) (0.0094)
log(dollarizationt) 0.1425 *** 0.1353 *** 0.1396 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
d_sudden_stop * log(dollarizationt) -0.1102 ** -0.1103 ** -0.1092 **
(0.0393) (0.0417) (0.0451)
At,t?4log(terms of trade) -0.3510 *** -0.3676 *** -0.3511 ***
(0.0080) (0.0047) (0.0110)
d_episode *At,t?4log(terms of trade) 0.2291 0.2218 0.1233
(0.2924) (0.3104) (0.5630)
Observations 1239 1239 1239
Adjusted R2 0.3784 0.3914 0.3925
Heteroskedastic robust p-value inparentesis
* 10% significative; ** 5% significative; *** 1% significative
20